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IN 1954, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit adopted the Durham rule. It held in brief "that an accused [was] not
criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or
mental defect."'
Speaking through Judge Bazelon, the Court repudiated the "right-wrong"
test as the controlling test of criminal responsibility and declared:
The science of psychiatry now recognizes that a man is an integrated person-
ality and that reason, which is only one element in that personality, is not the
sole determinant of his conduct. The right-wrong test, which considers knowl-
edge or reason alone, is therefore an inadequate guide to mental responsibility
for criminal behavior
1 Durham v. United States, 214 F. 2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
2 Id. at 871.
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Thereafter, as seen by Judge Bazelon, in Durham v. United States, the jury
was "not required to depend on arbitrarily selected 'symptoms, phases, or
manifestations' of the disease as criteria for determining the ultimate ques-
tions of fact. ... 3 Instead it was to "be guided by wider horizons of knowl-
edge concerning mental life." 4
Summarizing the problem confronting the jury under the new test, Judge
Bazelon declared:
The question will be simply whether the accused acted because of a mental
disorder, and not whether he displayed particular symptoms which medical
science has long recognized do not necessarily, or even typically, accompany
even the most serious mental disorder.'
He concluded by linking the new rule to traditional conceptions of Abso-
lute Justice under the Categorical Imperative of the Penal Law:
The legal and moral traditions of the western world require that those who,
of their own free will and with evil intent (sometimes called mens rea), commit
acts which violate the law, shall be criminally responsible for those acts. Our
traditions also require that where such acts stem from and are the product of
a mental disease or defect as those terms are used herein, moral blame shall not
attach, and hence there will not be criminal responsibility.
Seen at first glance Durham directly invited the consideration of the non-
psychotic disorder as a valid exculpatory mental illness. Early hopes for the
expansion of the insanity defense appeared to receive the explicit encourage-
ment of the court during the next six to seven years. By 1957 post-Durham
case law had explicitly recognized non-psychotic psychopathology as capable
of effecting an acquittal by reason of insanity. The matter had been put suc-
cinctly in these words by Judge Bazelon:
The assumption that psychosis is a legally sufficient mental disease and that
other illnesses are not is erroneous.7
When a juror after several hours of deliberation "asked for further instruc-
tions as to whether 'in determining insanity ... any other consideration...
might be included.., than dementia or schizophrenia,' " and the trial court
refused to act upon this request, a conviction was reversed by the court of





7 Briscoe v. United States 248 F. 2d 640, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
' Wright v. United States, 250 F. 2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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juror's question and the denial of the requested instruction constitute reversi-
ble error ....9
To facilitate acquittal under the productivity test of the Durham rule, the
Court of Appeals furnished a standard of some elasticity. The requirement
that the act be a "product of" a disease was not to be viewed as a requirement
of direct or exclusive causal relationship between crime and illness but solely
as one of necessary or critical relationship in what was inevitably a multiple
chain of causal events. As expressed by the court:
When we say the defence of insanity requires that the act be a 'product of' a
disease, we do not mean that it must be a direct emission, or a proximate cre-
ation, or an immediate issue of the disease in the sense, for example, of Had-
field's delusion that the Almighty had directed him to shoot George III. We do
not mean to restrict this defense to such cases; many mental diseases so affect
areas of the mind that some or all of the mental elements requisite to criminal
liability under the law are lacking. We mean to include such cases.
When we say the defense of insanity requires that the act be a 'product of' a
disease, we mean that the facts on the record are such that the trier of the facts
is enabled to draw a reasonable inference that the accused would not have com-
mitted the act he did commit if he had not been diseased as he was. There
must be a relationship between the disease and the act, and that relationship,
whatever it may be in degree, must be, as we have already said, critical in its
effect in respect to the act. By 'critical' we mean decisive, determinative, causal;
we mean to convey the idea inherent in the phrases 'because of', 'except for',
'without which', 'but for', 'effect of', 'result of', 'causative factor'; the disease
made the effective or decisive difference between doing and not doing the act.
The short phrases 'product of' and 'causal connection' are not intended to be
precise, as though they were chemical formulae. They mean that the facts con-
cerning the disease and the facts concerning the act are such as to justify reason-
ably the conclusion that 'But for this disease the act would not have been com-
mitted."0
The evolving Durham jurisprudence, highlighted by these developments,
was of course subject to the gloss of constitutional and common law require-
ments as to "reasonable doubt" and burden of proof. Upon the presentation
of "some evidence" of mental disease or defect "settled law ... placed upon
the prosecution the burden of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.""
In this context the burden of convincing the jury clearly rested upon the
government. For it was the government which was then required to disprove
either the defendant's pathological state or the existence of the necessary
Id., at 11.
10 Carter v. United States, 252 F. 2d 608, 616-617 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
n Goforth v. United States, 269 F. 2d 778, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1959) and see cases of Davis v.
United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895) and Tatum v. United States, 190 F. 2d 612 (D.C. Cir. 1951)
cited therein.
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causal relationship and to do so beyond reasonable doubt. The nature of that
burden was most aptly conveyed in negative terms. As expressed by the Court
of Appeals, which disclaimed the formulation of "an instruction which would
be either appropriate or binding in all cases," jury instructions under the
Durham rule "should in some way convey to the jury the sense and substance
of the following:
If you the jury believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was not
suffering from a diseased or defective mental condition at the time he committed
the criminal act charged, you may find him guilty. If you believe he was suffer-
ing from a diseased or defective mental condition when he committed that act,
but believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the act was not the product of such
mental abnormality, you may find him guilty. Unless you believe beyond a
reasonable doubt either that he was not suffering from a diseased or defective
mental condition, or that the act was not the product of such abnormality, you
must find the accused not guilty by reason of insanity. Thus your task-would not
be completed upon finding, if you did find, that the accused suffered from a
mental disease or defect. He would still be responsible for his unlawful act if
there was no casual connection between such mental abnormality and the act.
These questions must be determined by you from the facts which you find to be
fairly deducible from the testimony and the evidence in this case.'
In this light, an instruction by the trial court could not be couched in such
terms as:
Now, a person is relieved of the responsibility for a crime by reason of insanity,
where it is found, first, that he was suffering from a mental defect or a mental
disease at the time of the offense, and, second, that his act was the product of that
mental defect or disease.... Now, you are instructed that if you find that the
defendant, Comer Blocker, committed the act complained of, that is, the shoot-
ing of Frances B. Hall on April 5th, 1957, while he was suffering from a mental
disease or defect, then you must consider the second requirement spoken of
before you may find him not guilty by reason of insanity....
Turning then to the shooting ... if your answer to the first requirement is yes,
the defendant, Comer Blocker, was suffering from a mental disease or defect,
and if you find that the defendant, Comer Blocker, did in fact commit such acts,
then you must find that it resulted from or was produced by the unsoundness,
or by the mental illness.... Now, if you find that then you may find the defend-
ant, Comer Blocker, not guilty by reason of insanity."
Addressing itself to the merits of the quoted jury charge, the Court of Ap-
peals declared:
"Durham v. United States, supra note 1, at 875. (Emphasis supplied).
18 Quotation by the Court of Appeals of trial court charge in Blocker v. United States, 288
F. 2d 853, 855 (D.C. Cir. 1961). (Emphasis supplied).
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This part of the instruction is plainly erroneous. The words 'where it is found',
'you must find' and 'if you find' informed the jury that the burden of convinc-
ing them-which is the burden of proof-was on the defendant."
Significantly, however, these landmark decisions were accompanied by in-
creasingly vigorous dissents, suggestive of a widening rift between appellate
judges on the use of the insanity defense. Several of the judges expressly de-
manded a repudiation of the Durham rule.1" Opinions, seemingly still aberra-
tional as of 1959, expressed themselves as opposed to the insanity defense in
cases in which evidence of mental illness was not obviously reflective of psy-
chotic psychopathology.' 6 Thus, a defendant who testified about himself in
terms reflective of delusions and visual hallucinations was held to have pre-
sented "some evidence of insanity" requiring the shifting of the burden of
proof to the government and the giving of appropriate instructions of insanity
as a defense to the jury. Failure to provide such instruction was held error
warranting reversal. 17 On the other hand, a defendant who presented evi-
dence that he had "become increasingly indolent, [that he had] a violent
temper, and... [had made] an unprovoked and unusually violent attack upon
another for some concocted grievance" and had seemed incoherent after his
arrest was held not to have made out such a case.' 8 The majority of the court
expressed this view in this connection:
To hold that an insanity issue is presented in a criminal case merely because
the accused had become increasingly indolent, has a violent temper, and then
makes an unprovoked and unusually violent attack upon another because of
some concocted grievance, would be tantamount to holding, as many psychia-
trists profess to believe, that any person who commits a crime is mentally ill and
should receive treatment instead of punishment. We are not prepared to make
such ruling.'
While the court as a whole had, in the early phase of Durham jurispru-
dence, assented to the proposition that a non-psychotic mental illness was
sufficient for acquittal by reason of insanity,2° it had at no time followed
through by requiring the trial court to charge the jury to the same effect.
14 Ibid.
15 See e.g., respectively, Opinions of Burger, J. and Wilbur K. Miller and Bastian, JJ. in
Blocker v. United States, supra note 13.
16 Smith v. United States, 272 F. 2d 547 (1959).
" Goforth v. United States, supra note 11.
I8 Smith v. United States, supra at 550. As summed up by Bazelon, J., dissenting.
[t]he victim of the attack, testified that he [the accused] first placed his hands over her
eyes, that he said nothing for a while, and that he then began to beat her and continued the
beating as they went down the street for a distance of about a block and a quarter, all the
while saying things that made no sense to her. Another witness testified that, as appellant
was dragging his wife along the street, he stopped to bind up her wound with a handker-
chief; and that, when the police arrived, appellant sat down and held the victim in his arms.
19 Id. at 549.
21 Briscoe v. United States, supra note 7.
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One is bound to note parenthetically in this connection that a search of
jury charges in the District Court of the District of Columbia covering the
years 1959 through 1961 failed to disclose a single instance in which a jury had
been explicitly apprised of the possibility of an acquittal founded on a find-
ing of non-psychotic mental disorder.
By the turn of the decade, moreover, the Court of Appeals was no longer
referring to the insanity defense of the non-psychotic individual as a desired
end. A departure from the paths originally charted by Durham seemed at
length to be dramatized in McDonald v. United States.2 1 There a panel of the
court, including Judge Bazelon, the author of the Durham rule, held that
acquittal by reason of insanity depended on a finding of such disease as "sub-
stantially affect[ed] mental or emotional processes and substantially im-
pair[ed] behavior controls." 22 By 1963, the court seemed explicitly bent upon
repudiating the probability, if not the possibility, of an insanity acquittal
based on non-psychotic mental disorder. For it held:
There must be a serious mental disease, and satisfactory evidence of causation,
before a verdict of acquittal by reason of insanity must follow as a matter of
law.'
By this time trial judges who sought to put "the right and wrong gloss" on
the insanity charge could count on the support of a majority of the Court of
Appeals Judges. By 1962 the wheel seemed to have turned full circle. In
Simpson v. United States,24 decided that year, the Court of Appeals declined
to find plain error in an insanity instruction by the District Court which
read:
As an example of this casual connection or relation, if a person at the time of
the commission of a crime is so deranged mentally that he cannot distinguish
between right and wrong, or, being able to tell right from wrong, he is unable
by virtue of his mental derangement to control his actions, then his act is the
product of his mental derangement.
The observation does not seem inapposite that if the Court of Appeals had
indeed sought to invite acquittal by reason of non-psychotic mental disorder
at any time, it was clearly no longer doing so by 1963 or indeed since that
time.25
312 F. 2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
" Id. at 851.
23Hightower v. United States, 325 F. 2d 616, 619 (D.C. Cir. 1963). (Emphasis supplied).
24303 F. 2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
Nor does it seem inapposite to remark that where the issue before the court was release
from confinement at St.Elizabeths Hospital as distinct from hospitalization as an alternative
to imprisonment in the conventional sense, the court continued to recognize the broadest
spectrum of non-psychotic psychopathology-significantly as a basis for the denial of liberty.
See, e.g. Overholser v. Leach, 257 F. 2d 667 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Overholser v. Russell, 283 F. 2d
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Before McDonald, however, and this ensuing avalanche, a study project
subsidized first by the Norman Foundation and later by the National Insti-
tute of Mental Health (between 1959 and 1963) sought to determine the
degree to which the non-psychotic mental disorder was securing significant
acceptance as a valid exculpatory mental illness in the courtroom. The
emerging project focused on the understanding of the doctrine governing in-
sanity acquittals by the critical decision makers in the District of Columbia.
A key category of such decision makers was of course the jury. Needless to say,
the insanity defense was at that time gauged by the standards of pre-McDon-
ald case law.
The part of the study reported in these pages was designed to secure in-
formation as to the understanding of the Durham jurisprudence by the jury
audience. It was hypothesized that jurors had a low comprehension of what
was said to them by judges near the conclusion of the trial about the law of
insanity. It was further hypothesized, however, that a clear and succinct state-
ment of the new law could significantly affect juror reaction. 26 A focus of in-
quiry therefore was the question as to whether the statement that "the as-
sumption that psychosis is a legally sufficient mental disease and that other
illnesses are not is erroneous" was in fact brought to the attention of the
jurors in any meaningful way.
THE JURY BACKGROUND
Attitude studies have portrayed the thinking of the average man and presum-
ably the average juror about the mentally ill. The studies corroborated the
general impression gleaned from lawyers interviewed in the Washington area
by project staff members throughout 1959 and 1960. Lawyers thus interviewed
suggested for the most part that a mental illness sufficient to secure acquittal
by reason of insanity was to be equated with extreme forms of psychosis and
that the public in their view appeared to group toward a M'Naghten type
formulation in the appraisal of criminal responsibility on its own initia-
tive.27 The views of other researchers in this field tended to be similar.
Reporting on the work of the National Opinion Research Center at the
University of Chicago carried out almost a decade ago, Shirley A. Starr voiced
a substantially identical opinion:
195 (D.C. Cir. 1960) and see Arens, The Strange Case of Frederick Lynch: Due Process and
the Rights of the Mentally Ill, 13 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 3 (1964).
2 Kelley, Hovland, et al., The Influence of Judges' Attitudes in Three Methods of Atti-
tude Scaling, 42 Soc. Psy. 147-158 (1955); Pintner and Forlano, The Influence of Attitude
Upon Scaling of Attitude Items, 8 Soc. PsY. 39-45 (1937).
The M'Naghten rule, the "right-wrong" test, stems from the famous M'Naghten case
decided by the House of Lords. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). By that time, however, the test had
already become prevalent. HALL, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw, 480 (1947).
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In practice, people make it clear that they do not generally regard behavior as
proof of mental illness, unless three interrelated condition obtain. First of all,
they look for a breakdown of intellect, an almost complete loss of cognitive
functioning or, in short, a loss of reason. And so, in explaining why a particular
example is not mentally ill, they frequently say things like, 'A lot of people who
are nervous, their minds are as good as they ever was' or 'she knows what she is
doing so her mind can't be affected.' Second, people expect, almost as a necessary
consequence of this loss of rationality, that the behavior called mental illness
must represent a serious loss of self-control, usually to the point of dangerous
violence against others and certainly to the point of not being responsible for
one's acts. Here people say an example is mentally ill because 'He isn't in con-
trol of himself' or because 'He's getting dangerous for the people who live with
him,' or someone else is not mentally ill because 'He isn't doing things he
shouldn't be doing' or because 'He isn't really out of control; he could stop
acting that way if he wanted to.'
Now all of this, I am sure, has a most familiar sound to all of you. ... It is, of
course, about the same set of moral norms and premises about man and his
nature that underlies all of our legal codes, governing who shall be held respon-
sible and punished for his acts and who shall be exempt from punishment by
reason of insanity. Or, in other words, it is an expression of an internally con-
sistent, rather well organized, morally grounded view of human nature and of
human conduct that is deeply engrained in Western civilzation.
According to this view of man, rationality and the ability to exercise self con-
trol are the central, basically human qualities. From this, it follows that the
normal person is rational, he is able to control himself and is responsible for
his acts, and his acts are reasonable, appropriate to the circumstances in which
he finds himself and intelligible to others in the light of those circumstances.
Given this view of normalcy, it follows quite consistently that if mental illness
represents the loss of normalcy or its opposite, it must necessarily turn out to
be a rather extreme form of psychosis.'
The results of yet another Chicago study bear critically on the problem
of juror reaction to the insanity defense. A recorded criminal trial was played
to twenty mock jury panels. The experimental transcript was modeled after
the real trial of United States v. Durham. Repetitious sections in the record,
however, had been condensed or deleted. Regular jurors were used, drawn
from the jury pools of Chicago metropolitan areas. The experiment was
conducted in a court house. The "jurors" were told that their deliberations
were being recorded and that their verdict could in no way affect the outcome
of the case. They were also told that the judges of the court were interested
11 Starr, The Public's Ideas About Mental Illness, Paper presented to the Annual Meeting
of the National Association for Mental Health, Sheraton Lincoln Hotel, Indianapolis, Ind.,
1955.
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in the result of the experiment for guidance in policy-making decisions.
Thereafter, in mock proceedings, half the number of available "jury panels"
was instructed in terms of the right-wrong standard of the M'Naghten rules.
The other half was instructed in terms of the Durham rule.
The researchers reported that a frequent criterion of differentiation be-
tween sane and insane behavior in a larceny or robbery prosecution was the
nature of the items that the defendant stole. Thus the fact that such items
were of little value indicated to some jurors that the crime was not carried out
for profit, i.e., that there was no rational purpose behind his behavior. Other
jurors, who argued in favor of a defendant's sanity, relied upon the fact that
a defendant had committed a crime against property as distinct from a crime
of violence against a person-a matter suggestive to those jurors of some
rational purpose and hence sanity.
A frequently cited fact suggestive of insanity to the public, as represented
by this experimental group, was the defendant's behavior when caught by
the police. Jurors thus pointed out that one defendant was hiding, cowering,
or playing possum and that another was trying to escape, the former tending
to be regarded as "abnormal", the latter as "normal" in such jury estimations.
The researcher concluded:
Two points emerge. The first is that all jurors, those instructed under M'Nagh-
ten as well as those instructed under Durham, believed that cognition was the
crucial factor in determining responsibility. The second point is that the Dur-
ham jurors appeared to have no more difficulty than the M'Naghten jurors in
construing the instructions to suit beliefs concerning the centrality of cog-
nition.'
The hypothesis seems plausible, in the light of these findings, that most
jurors would be predisposed to view an insanity defense as calling for nothing
short of highly persuasive evidence of severe psychotic disorientation. This
has been corroborated by an impressionistic survey of lawyers interviewed by
the Project throughout 1959 and 1960, which has been referred to supra.
Lawyers within that sample have consistently reported their feelings that
jury acceptance of an insanity defense hinged upon the establishment of
psychotic psychopathology, preferably one characterized by dramatic intel-
lectual disorientation.
Another Chicago jury study has suggested that jury instructions might
fail in their purpose because they are not understood by those to whom they
are addressed. Ten mock juries listened to a criminal trial in which a plea of
insanity had been entered in defense of an act of housebreaking. The jurors
were selected from the jury pools. The deliberations were transcribed and
2 James, Jurors' Assessment of Criminal Responsibility, 7 Soc. PROB. 58-68 (1959).
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analyzed. One category of analysis applied to the deliberations was "reference
to the court's instructions." The author, Professor Rita James, reported that
the jurors spent 8 per cent of their time on the court's instructions and that
they were approximately 58 per cent accurate in recalling these instructions.
This was seen as the lowest accuracy rate of recall of any material heard
during the trial. Professor James did not comment further except to note that
"the accuracy of the grade-school juror's interpretation of the Court's in-
structions . . . [was] significantly less than that of high-school and college
jurors."8o
Presumably the case heard by the mock juries in this study was also the
Durham case. On retrial, the judge's instructions were couched almost ver-
batim in the language of the Court of Appeals, which had reversed the lower
court. While not itself a model of clarity, the language appeared more com-
prehensible than current usage in the District Courts of the District of
Columbia.
The experimental study undertaken by the Project in the District of
Columbia in 1963 was designed to point up more definitely the level of com-
prehension of charges in use almost a decade after the Durham decision. It
would seem plausible in the light of the foregoing that the pedagogic function
of jury charges countering the public's misconceptions should clarify the law
of exculpatory mental disease required by early Durham jurisprudence.
Failure of that pedagogic function would seem to emerge from the materials
following.
College Students as Mock Jurors: An Experiment
Subjects
A phase of the 1963 study in the District of Columbia was conducted with the
cooperation of 229 undergraduate students, drawn from sociology and psy-
chology courses of local universities. (American University, George Washing-
ton University and Howard University). These undergraduates listened to
jury charges and took comprehension tests designed to register their under-
standing of the material to which they had been exposed.3'
Their motivation, probably inferior to that of a regular jury panel, could
not be regarded as insignificant in view of the elective character of their
socio-psychological studies and the voluntary nature of their participation.
I0 James, Status and Competence of Jurors, 65 AM. J. Soc. 563-567 (1959) (referring to level
of education).
81 The choice of classes was made by the departmental heads of sociology and psychology,
usually on the basis of the relevancy of the study to the subject of instruction. The indi-
vidual instructors were apprised of the investigation by a project staff member and asked
to say nothing to their classes in advance except that they would be subjects in an experi-
ment and were free to participate or not participate as they chose. The subjects were all
beyond their first years of college but were otherwise undifferentiated.
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It might be assumed, moreover, that the "testwiseness" of the subjects further
operated to increase their overall comprehension score on the test.3
2
Material to Be Understood
The material read to the subjects consisted of jury charges used in trials in
1961 and 1962. An informal concensus of criminal trial lawyers, based on
the manifest leaning of trial judges, was used to establish a four judge spec-
trum of judicial opinion ranging from one judge sympathetic toward, to one
dubious about, the utility of the insanity defense under the early standards
of the Durham rule. At one end of the scale was Judge D, representing maxi-
mal sympathy to the Durham-type insanity defense; he was hypothesized as
closely followed by Judge A. Judge C preceded Judge B, who in turn was
viewed as the least sympathetic of the four judges vis-a-vis Durham-type in-
sanity and thus represented the other end of the spectrum. A charge, used
by each of these judges in an actual trial, was read to the selected audiences.
33
A different charge was read to each of four subsamples, comprising groups of
48, 55, 56, and 70 subjects respectively. In addition to obtaining charges with
a view to covering the spectrum indicated, the charges were also selected with
a view to obtaining variation in complexity as well as variation in length,
significantly, however, subject to the limitation that the charges could not
exceed a reading period of thirty minutes.
Test Used
An eighteen-item test was constructed to determine the rate of comprehension
of the charges read.3 4 The questions were deliberately couched in the legal
language of the jury charges in order to stimulate recall.3 5 By reviving the
exact memories of the charge it was hoped to increase comprehension and
thus offset some of the differences between the experimental groups and
actual juries.
The following four question were regarded as critical in the light of earlier
Durham jurisprudence:
5. What is the rule governing an acquittal on grounds of insanity?
9. What degree of mental disease or defect is needed for an insanity acquittal?
10. Will minor mental diseases (i.e. psychoneuroses or personality disorders)
qualify for an insanity acquittal?
81 Most appeared alert and interested as the charge was read to them, in contrast to the
lack of attention of regular jurors observed by practicing members of the bar during the
judge's charge. This impression was corroborated by the fact that the overwhelming majori-
ty of students remained behind at the conclusion of the comprehension test to discuss the
implications of the materials.
See generally FURST, CONSTRUCTING EVALUATION INSTRUMENTS 208-210 (1958).
31 See Appendix.
3Bloom, Thought Processes in Lectures and Discussions, 7 J. GEN. EDUC. 160-169 (1953).
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18. May the jury acquit a defendant by reason of insanity if at the time of the
commission of the crime he knew what he was doing and understood that
he was wrong?
The validity of the test is based on rational rather than empirical methods.
Validity in this instance is a question of the relevance of the test content to
the subject matter of the charges as well as that of the test form to the objec-
tives of the study. This investigation is pathbreaking but by no means de-
finitive; we hope to stimulate further research in this area, not foreclose it.
Scoring and Analysis of Data
The response to each question in the test were tabulated as "accurate", "in-
accurate" or as "no response". The data was then summarized in percentages
designed to provide a rate of comprehension for each jury charge.
Procedure
After the test forms had been passed out a project staff member read the
following instructions, inter alia, to the class:
We are interested in how well a judge's instruction to a jury are understood.
In effect, we are asking you to imagine you are a jury. The trial is almost over.
Before you reach a verdict, the judge will inform you as to your role in the
case....
A jury charge, as such information is called, will be read to you. After hearing
it, please fill out the questionaire as completely and concisely as you can.
The subjects were given approximately thirty minutes to answer the ques-
tions.
Initial Findings
The impression gleaned from the emotional response to the questions is in
many ways as significant as the statistical evaluation of the data which follows.
We have sought to highlight this impression by the juxtaposition of the
actual language of each charge with typical examples of obviously erroneous
replies provided by respondents. s6 Since the issues were closely related, the
questions inevitably overlapped and the charge material quoted below neces-
sarily related to more than one question.
Judge A's charge on the subject matter of questions 5, 9, 10 and 18 read in
salient part as follows: s 7
We judge obvious error of course entirely from the standpoint of Durham case law
before McDonald v. United States, supra note 21.
' U.S. v. Lewis, Criminal Action No. 821-61.
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Stated briefly, the general standard in determining if a person is responsible for
his actions is this: The accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act
was the product of a mental disease or disorder. As you will note, this standard
embraces two distinct and necessary elements. One such element is that the
defendant must have been suffering from a mental disease or a mental defect at
the time of the unlawful act; and secondly, the unlawful act must have been
the product of the mental disease or mental defect.
Let me explain in a little greater detail the pertinent elements of this stand-
ard, they being, one, mental disease or mental defect, and two, the unlawful
act being the product of the mental disease or mental defect. A mental disease
is a condition of the mind that is considered capable of improving or deterio-
rating....
Now what do I mean when I say that the unlawful act must be the product of
the mental disease or mental defect? I mean this: that the facts of the record
are such that you the jury may draw a reasonable inference that the accused
would not have committed the act that he did commit if he had not been men-
tally diseased or mentally defective at the time.
In other words, there must be a relation between the mental disease or the
mental defect and the act and whatever it may be in degree, it must be critical,
decisive, determinative or causal in its effect in respect to the act. The phrases
'product of' and 'causal connection' are not intended to be as precise as though
they were chemical formulae. They mean that the facts concerning the mental
disease or mental defect and the facts concerning the act are such as to justify
reasonably the conclusion that but for this mental disease or mental defect, the
act would not have been committed.
Question No. 5, we repeat, inquired as follows:
What is the rule governing an acquittal on grounds of insanity?
The following answers were characteristic of those erroneously responding
to it:
Mentally insane, such that the person is not reasoning or using his mind in
the ordinary sense. "He must be completely unreasonable, incapable of think-
ing."
Question No. 9, we repeat, inquired as follows:
What degree of mental disease or defect is needed for an insanity acquittal?
The following answers were characteristic of those erroneously responding
to it:
To the effect that the person had no knowledge or control of his actions at
the time of the crime.
The disease or defect must be to the degree that the crime would not have
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been committed without it. Probably to the degree that the person had no con-
trol over his act.
A mental disease or defect for an insanity acquittal would have to be serious
enough to color judgment.
When the insane person is completely unconscious of what he is doing.
Reasonable doubt as to the defendant's sanity, that he was able to judge his
actions at the time of the crime.
To the extent that the individual was not responsible for his actions.
To the point it was not his fault for committing crime.
Question No. 10, we repeat, inquired as follows:
Will minor mental diseases (i.e., psychoneuroses or personality disorders)
qualify for an insanity acquittal?
The following answers were characteristic of those erroneously responding
to it:
I do not think that these minor mental diseases would qualify for an insanity
acquittal as the person would probably still have control over his acts and could
distinguish right from wrong.
Yes, if they make the person unable to distinguish between right and wrong
but usually these minor ones don't.
They shouldn't, actually every person has a slight case of neuroses, but psy-
chosis, yes.
Question No. 18, we repeat, inquired as follows:
May the jury acquit a defendant by reason of insanity if at the time of the
commission of the crime he knew what he was doing and understood that it
was wrong?
The following answers were characteristic of those erroneously responding
to it:
Yes, if the insanity caused a compulsion which the person was unable to con-
trol.
No, but how can we make sure that he knew it was wrong and still be insane,
if he knew it perfectly well and did it with intention. ...
Yes, mental disease might impel him to act.
The charge by Judge B on the subject matter of questions 5, 9, 10 and 18
read in salient part as follows:38
.. there are certain types of persons afflicted with mental diseases or mental
defects who are held responsible for particular crimes, and the test is this: If
the defendant was suffering from some mental disease or from some mental
U.S. v. Brown, Criminal Action No. 744-61.
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defect, or to put it another way, from diseased or defective mental condition,
at the time when the crime was committed, and further-and this is very impor-
tant-if the crime itself was the product of that mental disease or mental defect,
then, and only then, the defendant is not responsible for his criminal act.
Now, let me repeat. If you find that the defendant was not suffering from a
mental disease or mental defect at the time of the commission of the offense,
then you may not find him not guilty on the ground of insanity. But even if you
find that he was suffering from a mental disease, but if you find that the crime
was not the product of the mental disease or mental defect, then, too, you may
not find him not guilty on the ground of insanity.
Now what makes a crime the product of mental disease? If the defendant is
so mentally ill or so mentally defective that he is unable to distinguish between
right and wrong and is unable to realize that what he was doing was wrong, then
the crime would be a product of the mental illness or mental defect.
However, it is not in every case in which the accused is suffering from some
mental abnormality or some mental deficiency or defect or from some mental
disease or disorder that he is to be deemed free from liability for his crimes and
not responsible for his acts. There are many abnormal persons or many persons
with mental deficiencies or persons suffering from mental disorders or diseases
or personality disorders whom the law holds responsible, in certain instances, for
a crime that such a person may commit. Obviously there are good reasons for
this.
Further, even if the defendant could distinguish between right and wrong
and if he could realize that what he was doing was wrong, yet because of his
mental derangement or defect he was unable to adhere to the right and was
unable to refrain from doing wrong, then also the crime can be said to be a prod-
uct of mental disease.
On the other hand, if in spite of a mental illness or a mental defect the de-
fendant was able to distinguish between right and wrong and to know that
what he was doing was wrong and, further, if he was able to refrain from doing
wrong and able to adhere to the right and was under no compulsion or inner
urge or irresistible impulse by reason of his mental illness or defect the criminal
act, then, too, it cannot be said that the crime was the product of mental ill-
ness.
First, what is the evidence of the question as to whether the defendant was
suffering from any disease or mental defect at the time he committed the alleged
crime? You will recall that the crime is charged to have been committed on
August 31st, 1961. On January 25th, 1962, about five months later, it was deter-
mined at a staff conference that the defendant was suffering from a mental
disease at the time of the conference, five months later. The doctors admit that
the defendant was not clearly or flagrantly insane. There are two diagnoses, in
a sense. Some of the members of the staff conference reached the conclusion
that the defendant was suffering from a mental illness, the name of which is
schizophrenic reaction, paranoid type. Dr. Owens, who presided at the staff
conference and who is the superior officer of the other two expert witnesses,
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testified that in his opinion the defendant was suffering from a lesser mental
disease, known as paranoid personality, and that, too, was not insanity. The
majority of the doctors were unable to form an opinion whether the defendant
suffered from mental illness on August 31st, when the crime is charged to have
been committed. However, two of the members of the staff conference, Dr. Dobbs
and Dr. Platkin, testified that in their opinion the mental illness from which the
defendant was suffering had been in existence for some time. They all agreed
that the defendant was of normal intelligence and had no mental defect, there-
fore, or mental deficiency.
Now let us take the lay testimony. The two police officers who made the arrest
testified that the defendant was with them for three or four hours on the day of
his arrest, on August 31st, and that in the course of that time they observed him,
they questioned him, and that they found him normal and of sound mind.
Now, all three doctors who testified in this case agree that the defendant's
mental disease, if he had it, was not of a kind that would have prevented him
from distinguishing between right and wrong and that he would have been able
to tell and to know that what he was doing was wrong. Dr. Platkin further testi-
fied-I think I want to modify my remark. Two of the three doctors had agreed
that the defendant was not prevented by mental disease from distinguishing be-
tween right and wrong and that he would be able to know that what he was
doing was wrong. Dr. Dobbs, the lady doctor, said she could not form an opinion,
she did not know. Well, I think she said one thing at one time and another thing
at another time. She said at one time that he would have been able to distin-
guish right from wrong, but that she had difficulty in saying whether he was
moved by an irresistible impulse. Dr. Platkin, however, was definite that the
defendant could distinguish between right and wrong, could have known that
what he was doing was wrong, and also that he was not moved by any irresistible
impulse or any compulsion caused by mental disease, that what he was led by
was just his addiction and not any mental disease. Dr. Owens testified that in
his opinion the defendant was able to distinguish between right and wrong and
to adhere to the right as of the date of his examination.
Question No. 5, we repeat, inquired as follows:
What is the rule governing an acquittal on grounds of insanity?
The following answers were characteristic of those erroneously responding
to that question:
If insane, the defendant must not be able to judge right from wrong. He must
be in this state at the time the crime was committed.
Enough evidence must be given to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was not in control of his faculties during the crime.
That the mental disease rendered him helpless re his actions.
The defendant must be diagnosed as being incapable (insane) of understand-
ing the nature of his crime at the time it was committed.
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The defendant has to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that he is insane
or incapable of making decisions or caring for himself.
Question No. 9, we repeat, inquired as follows:
What degree of mental disease or defect is needed for an insanity acquittal?
The following answers are characteristic of those erroneously responding
to that question:
The person doesn't know right from wrong or that he knows right from
wrong but is still unable to do the right because of certain impulses which in-
fluence him to do wrong.
Any degree which prevents rational thinking. A mind which goes awry of
what society expects.
To the extent that they interrupted correct thinking or instigate unreason-
able occurrences.
When the person cannot distinguish right from wrong.
Knowing that the person was insane and incapable of making decisions at the
time of the crime is sufficient.
The degree to which the defendant is completely unaware or has no control
over his actions.
Question No. 10, we repeat, inquired as follows:
Will minor mental diseases (i.e.., psychoneuroses or personality disorders)
qualify for an insanity acquittal?
The following answers are characteristic of those erroneously responding
to that question:
No, because the person still knows when he is doing wrong.
If it can be proven that the mental disease kept the defendant from knowing
right from wrong and/or adhering to the right. However, psychoneuroses or
personality disorders are not usually of the order to inhibit such distinctions.
No, it must be insanity affecting a person's concept of right and wrong.
Obviously from what the judge told the jury I must answer NO.
No-nearly everyone suffers from some minor mental disorders.
Question No. 18, we repeat, inquired as follows:
May the jury acquit a defendant by reason of insanity if at the time of the
commission of the crime he knew what he was doing and understood that it was
wrong?
The following answers were characteristic of those erroneously responding
to that question:
No, if he could help himself. Yes, if he couldn't help himself or stop himself.
Yes, they can, but it would not be in keeping with their instructions. In other
words they should not.
Under the law as stated in the judge's charge to the jury-NO
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The charge by Judge C on the subject matter of questions 5, 9, 10 and 18
read in salient part as follows:8 9
In order for a person to be relieved of responsibility for crimes by reason of
insanity, first, he must have suffered from a mental disease or defect at the time
of the offense and secondly, his acts must have been the product of the mental
disease or defect.
It is not necessary that any particular type of mental disease or defect be
proved. All that is necessary is that the defendant was suffering from any mental
disease or defect at the time of the offense.
The degree of mental illness is not controlling. The question for your deter-
mination is whether the defendant was in fact suffering from any mental
disease or defect.
Now, as to the second element, that the criminal act was the product of the
mental abnormality. This simply means that the act resulted from or was pro-
duced by or was caused by the mental disease or defect suffered by the defendant
or to put it another way, that the defendant would not have committed the
offense but for his mental disease or defect.
As one example of this causal connection or relation, if a person at the time
of the commission of a crime is so deranged mentally that he cannot distinguish
between right and wrong or able to tell right from wrong, is unable by virtue
of his mental derangement to control his actions, then his act is the product of
his mental derangement.
Question No. 5, we repeat, inquired as follows:
What is the rule governing an acquittal on grounds of insanity?
The following answers were characteristic of those erroneously responding
to it:
That person didn't know right from wrong when crime was committed.
The defendant must not have been responsible for his acts because of his
mental condition; he had no control over his actions.
Was crime committed while defendant was affected by his disease-could he
tell right from wrong and control his conduct?
Question No. 9, we repeat, inquired as follows:
What degree of mental disease or defect is needed for an insanity acquittal?
The following answers were characteristic of those erroneously responding
to it:
Any degree that would impair an individual's judgment at the time of the
crime.
A bad one-the person must be completely incapable of controlling himself.
Enough so that defendant doesn't know difference between right or wrong-or
that, because of the nature of the illness, he couldn't keep from committing the
crime.
aO U.S. v. Horton, Criminal Action No. 59-62.
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That the defendant was mentally incompetent at the time the actions were
committed.
The degree to which the individual can no longer be held responsible for his
acts.
He need be injurious to himself or society.
Person not capable of handling self.
When the defendant is not responsible for his actions he can't control them
and has as a result of the disorder lost his senses of right and wrong.
That the person didn't realize what he was doing at the time of the crime.
Question No. 10, we repeat, inquired as follows:
Will minor mental diseases (i.e., psychoneuroses or personality disorders)
qualify for an insanity acquittal?
The following answers were characteristic of those erroneously responding
to it:
There is no set answer for this. It depends on how seriously the psy-
choneuroses or personality disorders have effected the person's orientation with
reality and how deeply rooted the causes of these disorders may be.
Not usually. If the defendant is aware of what he is doing and that it is wrong
he is not acquitted.
If these neuroses or disorders are of such a degree of anxiety or frustration so
as to compel the individual to involuntary action.
Only if they prevent the defendant from controlling his actions.
Yes, certainly, if they influenced the act, providing the jury thinks the man
was sufficiently abnormal.
No. For in the cases of the psychoneurosis and personality disorders the in-
dividual has not lost contact with reality and he is still able to distinguish right
from wrong.
Question No. 18, we repeat, inquired as follows:
May the jury acquit a defendant by reason of insanity if at the time of the
commission of the crime he knew what he was doing and understood that it was
wrong?
The following answers were characteristic of those erroneously responding
to it:
No. Insanity is judged, I think, by a demonstration that the defendant didn't
know the difference between right and wrong.
If the person were insane, his reasoning ability would be affected, and he
therefore would not realize the moral implications of his crime. If he knew what
he were doing I would have doubts as to his insanity being the cause of the crime.
I don't think the jury should acquit the defendant on these grounds alone.
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Yes--but it must be shown that the defendant was suffering from insanity
and not a disease.
It may if they decided that he could not control himself.
No (contradiction in terms).
No, the person is guilty if he knew what he was doing at the time, then he
wouldn't have been considered to have a mental disease.
The charge by Judge D on the subject matter of questions 5, 9, 10 and 18
read in salient part as follows:
40
This defense of insanity has two parts. First, it must appear that the defendant
at the time the offense was committed was suffering from some mental disease
or to put it in a somewhat different way, he must have been suffering from a
diseased mental condition at the time the crime was committed.
Second, it must appear that the crime was a product of this mental disease.
In certain instances the law does not hold an insane person responsible for his
acts. In order to be responsible for his acts, a person must have the mental
capacity to commit the act with which he is charged. It is not however, in every
case in which the accused is suffering from mental abnormality or some mental
disease that he is not to be held responsible for his act. There are many abnor-
mal persons whom the law holds responsible in certain instances for a crime
that such a person commits.
On the first point of the defense of insanity, the Court instructs you that by
mental disease is meant mental illness, some medically recognizable disease of
the mind. By disease is meant a condition which is considered capable of either
improving or deteriorating. Further, in determining whether the defendant
was insane, that is, whether he was suffering from mental disease on the day of
the commission of the crime, you also have a right to consider whether he knew
the difference between right or wrong, or even though he knew the difference be-
tween right and wrong, whether he acted under the compulsion of an irresistible
impulse or had been deprived of or lost the power of his will, but you are not
limited in these matters, but may consider all of the evidence in order to reach
a conclusion as to whether or not the defendant was or was not suffering from a
mental disease at the time in question.
Question No. 5, we repeat, inquired as follows:
What is the rule governing an acquittal on grounds of insanity?
The following answers were characteristic of those erroneously responding
to it:
The rule governing an acquittal on grounds of insanity states that the defend-
ant must have been insane (to the extent that he didn't know right from wrong)
at the time of the crime.
Defendant found not guilty because his actions were beyond his control.
40 U.S. v. Brooks, Criminal Action No. 355-62.
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Question No. 9, we repeat, inquired as follows:
What degree of mental disease or defect is needed for an insanity acquittal?
The following answers were characteristic of those erroneously responding
to it:
The defendant must be proved seriously mentally ill enough at the time he
committed the crime or that he was so mentally ill he didn't know what he was
doing or he knew what he was doing but he had an irresistible urge to commit
the act.
A high enough degree to cause the defendant to commit a crime (compulsion).
The degree that the person has had a history of irresponsible acts due to this
illness.
To the degree that the mentally ill person commits a crime. Many people
suffer from mental defects or diseases but are not so afflicted as to commit a crime
without the knowledge of the commission of the crime, or that the act they are
performing is a criminal one. I think the best answer is whether they are im-
paired to such a degree as to know right from wrong or are unaware of the
crime itself after they committed it.
To the degree of not knowing why one committed the crime.
When one is harmful to himself and those around him.
Question No. 10, we repeat, inquired as follows:
Will minor mental diseases (i.e., psychoneuroses or personality disorders)
qualify for an insanity acquittal?
The following answers are characteristic of those erroneously responding
to question No. 10:
Yes, if they place the ability to control one's actions beyond one's will.
Question No. 18, we repeat, inquired as follows:
May the jury acquit a defendant by reason of insanity if at the time of the
commission of the crime he knew what he was doing and understood that it
was wrong?
The following answers are characteristic of those erroneously responding
to it:
Yes, if the defense has proved that the defendant was urged on by a compul-
sion.




A statistical analysis was also undertaken to provide further depth.
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From this perspective it was clear that the rate of comprehension of the
law of insanity was dramatically low for each judge. While the experimental
group's comprehension on separate questions varied from 11 per cent to 69
per cent, more significance should be attached to the bottom marginal per-
centage for each question. From this perspective the variation between ques-
tions is only 30 per cent to 43 per cent. It is also clear that the rate of com-
prehension from charge to charge is low. The right hand marginal averages
show that charge A had an average comprehension rate of 40 per cent, the
highest of the four; charge C has the lowest comprehension rate, 31 per cent.
Parenthetically, it may be observed, there appears to be no obvious relation
between length of charge and comprehension. The shortest charge, A, did in
fact have the highest rate of comprehension, but the longest charge, D, did
not have the lowest rate.
This is documented in Table I on a charge by charge and judge by judge
basis.
TABLE I
Group Comprehension Rates on Selected Questions
of Productivity and Mental Disease
Overall
Charge Questions Percent
No. 5 No. 9 No. 10 No. 18
A 39% 50% 52% 20% (40%)
(231 lines long: 48 subjects)
B 18% 11% 35% 69% (33%)
(440 lines long: 55 subjects)
C 31% 36% 41% 17% (31%)
(484 lines long: 70 subjects)
D 33% 28% 47% 28% (34%)
(539 lines long: 56 subjects)
Overall Percent (30%) (30%) (43%) (33%)
What these findings mean can be graphically portrayed. In three out of
four trials, only one-third of the jurors could be expected to recall the judge's
charges with significant accuracy during deliberations on the law of insanity.
We note that the mock jury's comprehension of judicial instructions was
distinctly lower than the 58 per cent accuracy count found in the Chicago
study. This finding is suggestive but not conclusive. The designs of the two
experiments were different. There is thus a lack of direct comparability be-
tween their results. For significant answers to the question of whether there
has been a decline in the quality of instructions to the jury, a sample of
charges, drawn from the early years following Durham would have to be
compared with a sample drawn from later years.
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A comparison of the accuracy of recall of the insanity defense aspects of the
charge with that of the burden of proof statements contained in the self-
same judicial instructions is however more helpful. Table II provides such
an analysis on a charge by charge and judge by judge basis.
TABLE II
Comprehension of Productivity and Mental Disease









What was said of the law of insanity must now be said of the burden of
proof in the charges: comprehension was dramatically low. We must note at
this stage that the law of the insanity defense is typically discussed but once,
near the conclusion of the charge, while the burden of proof requirement is
repeated at least twice or three times throughout the body of the charge. If
repetition is important to comprehension, the burden of proof instruction
should have a more positive effect. Failure to secure such an effect is particu-
larly discouraging to a democratic social order.
If comprehension of the charge by the jury is to be analyzed as well as
described, two variables must be dealt with: comprehension as a function of
judge's message to the jury and comprehension as a function of the jury's
reception of the message, i.e., the charge.
A relevant inquiry is whether the low rate of comprehension is explain-
able by the quality of the mock jurors utilized or the judicial proclivities
manifested in the charge. One may properly assume in this connection that
a difference in comprehension in a postulated direction between two
homogeneous samples would provide meaningful substantiation of these
assertions.
It is common knowledge in the District of Columbia that the local univer-
sities which took part in this study draw their students from predominantly
different segments of the population at large. It was therefore assumed that
classes at the same college were more like one another intellectually and
academically than they were like classes at any other university, hence that
each college sample had a high degree of homogeneity.
College Sample I was composed of three classes or subsamples. Each class
was read a different charge: one by Judge A, another by Judge B, the third
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by Judge D, respectively. The three classes comprising College Sample II
were also read charges by Judges A, B and D, respectively. College Sample
III, however, was made up of only one class or subsample which was read the
charge by Judge C. This was not intentional but stemmed from scheduling
difficulties.
For the purpose of testing the hypothesis that there was no difference be-
tween the comprehension rates of the subjects in this study and the compre-
hension rates noted in the Chicago mock jury, the scores of the subsample
classes were combined. This was repeated for the purpose of comparing
comprehension of burden of proof with that of the insanity defense. This
procedure provided the data utilized in Tables I and II. Thus as shown by
those tables, Judge A's charge, to use that example, was comprehended by
40 per cent of the subjects (the subjects were combinations of students from
both College I and College II).
The question arises as to whether the inadequate comprehension dis-
covered in this context is attributable to the quality of the audience or the
manifest attitude of the judges. Since Samples I and II were qualitatively
distinguishable and were read the same charges, they could definitely be
assumed capable of providing some useful answers. Sample III represented
the only college to have heard Judge C's charge and therefore cannot be
compared with either of the other samples; it was omitted in the analysis of
differences between judges and between samples set forth in Table III.
TABLE III




I 41% 33% 46% (40%)
(78 subjects) 27* 270 24*
IX 37% 36% 40% (38%)
(82 subjects) 21 *  28* 33*
number of subjects in each class
Test results reflect a slight, although not statistically significant, differ-
ence between the samples. As Table III shows, Sample I achieved an overall
comprehension rate of 40 per cent whereas Sample II received only 38 per
cent in comprehension. The college for Sample I had a higher academic
standing than the college for Sample II. The expectation that Sample I
would have a significantly higher proportion of subjects comprehending the
charge has not been realized. From the perspective of this study, these results
may then be interpreted to mean that comprehension will not be significantly
increased regardless of the quality of the jury.
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Table III also provides data to test the assertion that there is a difference
between rates of comprehension of charges attributable to the manifest lean-
ing of the judges toward the insanity defense. It was postulated, supra, that
the judges would rank B, A and D, (moving from low to high) in making
their respective instructions comprehensible. That is, it was expected that
the judges would hold their positions relative to one another, from sample
to sample, regardless of the actual rate of comprehension. The data show a
difference in comprehension of charges stemming from different judges
in the exact direction forecast.
In Sample I, moving from low to high comprehension on the part of the
audience, the judges rank B, A and D; in Sample II they also rank B, A and
D. The hypothesis seems thus substantiated by these data; the difference be-
tween judges is significant.
We note parenthetically tha it has been only recently that the legal system
and its decision-makers (judges, lawyers and jurors) have been subjected to
anything approximating systematic empirical inquiry, particularly with
regard to the personality variable. Our data suggest the need for intensified
research to assess more precisely the role of this variable in this field.4'
The results, in sum, must be regarded as scientifically tentative; further
research is clearly needed. In the meantime, it does not appear immodest
to suggest that these results are significantly suggestive of the actual working
of our trial system. 42 The emerging picture does not lend itself to self-con-
gratulation by any of the decision-makers involved, be they judges, jurors,
or lawyers.
CONCLUSION
Jurors, as judged by the samples analyzed and reported, manifest startingly
low comprehension of the charge materials with which they are presented.
This conclusion does not come as a surprise to trial lawyers. It has thus
been commonplace among trial lawyers to assume that it "is wholly unrealis-
tic that a lay jury can absorb instructions in a complex case and later in the
jury room, relying solely on memory to recall the contents of the instructions
with the necessary precision to decide the issues meaningfully and according
to the law and the evidence." 43
Some observers have characterized the jury instruction in a complex case
as tending to be "a tangled complexity of verbiage, much of which is neither
"WEYRAUCH, THE PERSONALITY OF LAWYERS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1964) is deserving of
widespread attention in this context.
"' The results are indeed consistent with the views of the fate of the insanity defense ex-
pressed by the majority of trial lawyers interviewed by project staff members in the District
of Columbia in 1959-1960.
1 Raymond, Merits and Demerits of the Missouri System of Instructing Juries, 5 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 317, 319 (1959).
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usable nor understandable by laymen." 44 Available empirical evidence does
not contradict the validity of these observations in the context of the insanity
defense in the District of Columbia. Such evidence in fact points inexorably
to the failure of the pedagogic function of the trial court, a failure which
invites in turn the usurpation of the law-determining function by the jury.
It seems obvious in the context of the insanity defense as well as in any other
context, that jurors are bound to fall back upon a jurisprudence of their
own in the absence of clearcut guidance from the bench.
We refer again to the data furnished by the public opinion surveys, dis-
cussed above, highlighting the difficulty manifest by the public in conceptu-
alizing mental illness. The popular conception has thus been couched in
terms of bizarre behavior manifestations, suggestive of the "Wild Beast Test,"
and an inability to distinguish right from wrong, or some other cognitive
failure, suggestive of the M'Naghten Rules.
In the light of the data furnished by our study, it seems obvious that these
conceptions, rather than those of early Durham jurisprudence guide and con-
trol jury deliberations in cases involving the insanity defense in the District
of Columbia. 45 These conceptions moreover would seem to be reinforced,
however subtly, by some jury charges. 46 Plus ra change, plus c'est la mdme
chose. The impact of early Durham jurisprudence on the trial proceedings
is in sum not observable even in the days when such jurisprudence represents
official doctrine.
Far more shocking than the morass of ignorance respecting mental disease
and defect is the operative presumption of the defendant's guilt expressed
in the studied reactions of mock jurors as to burden of proof. Thus, the low
comprehension characterizing the assessment of the insanity defense is fully
matched by the low comprehension governing the assessment of the burden
of proof. This finding is particularly ominous because plainly correct instruc-
tions as to burden of proof are given on at least two or three occasions in each
charge while the insanity defense is dealt with only once as a general rule.
It seems relevant to point out in this connection that the comprehension
of instructions seems to vary depending, in significant measure, upon the
nature of the instructions and their source. Inquiry into the individual
judicial proclivities in this field seems no more irrelevant than in others.47 It
"Note, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 223-4 (1949).
"We refer to "early" Durham jurisprudence by design and raise the question as to
whether the later case law of the United States Court of Appeals covering the last three
years has not effectively destroyed the legal validity of the proposition, once championed by
the court, that "the assumption that psychosis is a legally sufficient mental illness and that
others are not is erroneous." Cf. Briscoe v. United States, supra note 7, with McDonald v.
United States, supra note 21, and Hightower v. United States, supra note 23.
"Motivations of the trial judges, among other variables affecting the insanity defense,
are assessed by means of a "content-analysis" of such jury instructions in a study now in proc-
ess of preparation for publication by the co-authors.
7 See generally LASSWELL, POWER AND PERSONALITY (1948).
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may be suggested at this time that the attitude of the judge towards the rights
of the accused as well as toward the insanity defense may be material in
affecting the degree of jury comprehension of the applicable law contained
in the jury instructions. Obviously this is something which requires extensive
testing under far more rigorous conditions than obtained in the study which
we have described.
Regardless of judicial attitude, however, the fact remains, we repeat, that
jurors' comprehension of the analyzed materials did not even achieve the 58
per cent comprehension rate reported in the Chicago study.
We conclude in sum that the studied instructions have not been conducive
to fair or enlightened jury fact-finding. Research designed to provide a model
jury charge in this field, to speak of no others, is overdue.48
Without awaiting the results of such research however we suggest that the
jury charge might well be improved by making it somewhat shorter and
structurally more memorable and by focusing it explicitly on such areas of
jury misconceptions as have been laid bare. The avoidance of the conveyance
of judicial bias, conscious or unconscious, subtle or otherwise, is of course
critical and will be the subject of a study based upon "content analysis."
It seems reasonable to endorse the practice prevailing in some jurisdictions
of permitting the jury to take copies of the charge into the jury room and
thus avoid the needless addition of the fallibility of human memory to other
imponderables, affecting the fate of the accused. 49
We would also endorse a system of "training for jury service." The sub-
jection of prospective jurors to indoctrinating lectures on the rules which they
are likely to be called upon to apply-not the least of which is the presump-
tion of innocence of the accused-does not seem an exorbitant price for a
public order dedicated to the maintenance of human dignity. Ideally-it
would seem to us-such lectures would be given by members of the appellate
bench.50
Most compelling of all, however, is the task of educating the public at
large for which lawyers must assume primary responsibility. For until such
time as the public itself elects to place a "prime value on the individual-
8 Such research could well involve measurement of readability. See generally FT.S H, How
To TEST READABILITY (1951). The lessons derived from such a study could in turn be
utilized in the formulation of a tentative model charge. Such a charge could then be sub-
jected to comprehension testing with appropriate controls. Final reformulation of the model
charge could then take place in the light of the over-all experience.
19 See generally Cunningham, Should Instructions Go Into jury Room, 33 J. of State Bar of
Cal. 278 (1958).
50 Varying degrees of indoctrination of prospective jurors including a judicial address to
prospective jurors outlining their duties and responsibilities have received appellate
approval in the past. See, e.g., People v. Izzo, 14 Ill. 2d 203, 151 N.E. 2d 329 (1958); People
v. Lopez, 32 Cal. 2d 673, 197 P. 2d 757 (1948), Horton v. United States, 256 F. 2d 138 (6th
Cir. 1958). Cf. The suggestions for reforms, designed to render trial by jury less dangerous,
made by the late Judge Jerome Frank, in FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, 145 (1950).
1965]
Catholic University Law Review
any individual, be he citizen or alien, useful or harmful, sane or mad,"51 we





1. What defense did the defendant raise in answer to the criminal charges?
2. What are the possible verdicts the jury can return in this case?
3. What verdict do you think the judge favored? Why?
4. What is your understanding of the duty of the jury under the following circum-
stances respectively:
(a) The defendant presents some evidence that the crime or crimes charged
against him are the products of a mental disease and there is no rebuttal by
the prosecution?
(b) Upon consideration of the evidence of prosecution and defense witnesses.
the defendant appears to have been the victim of a mental disease as of the
time of the crime and equally significant inferences are possible in either
direction as to whether the crime was a product of the mental disease?
5. What is the rule governing an acquittal on grounds of insanity?
6. What disposition is made of a person found not guilty by reason of insanity?
7. What is a mental disease?
8. What is a mental defect?
9. What degree of mental disease or defect is needed for an insanity acquittal?
10. Will minor mental diseases (i.e., psychoneuroses or personality disorders) qualify
for an insanity acquittal?
11. Must the defendant have a mental disease at the time of the trial to be found not
guilty by reason of insanity?
12. What is assumed to be true about the defendant's mental condition before any
evidence is offered?
13. What is the effect of some evidence of mental disease?
14. Is this the same as the effect of some evidence of insanity?
15. What should be the verdict if the evidence indicated, respectively, beyond a
reasonable doubt that:
(a) the defendant had no mental disease or defect?
(b) the defendant had a mental disease or defect but his act was not the product
of the disease?
(c) the criminal act was the product of the defendant's mental disease?
16. What should be the verdict if the evidence raised a reasonable doubt
(a) that the defendant was a victim of mental disease as of the time of the
crime?
or
(b) that the defendant's crime was caused by a mental disease?
m Dession, The Technique of Public Order, 5 BUFFALO L. REv. 22 (1955).
5 Such discrepancies of course are by no means confined to the insanity defense or indeed
of the criminal trial. See ARENS AND LASSWELL, IN DEFENSE OF PUBLIC ORDER (1961).
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17. What is the difference, if any, between a crime produced by insanity and a
crime produced by mental disease or defect?
18. May the jury acquit a defendant by reason of insanity if at the time of the com-
mission of the crime he knew what he was doing and understood that it was
wrong?
